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Abstract:  
We consider a world in which the mode of food production, foraging or agriculture, is 
endogenous, and in which technology grows exogenously. Within a model of 
coalition formation, we allow individuals to rationally form cooperative communities 
(bands) of foragers or farmers. At the lowest levels of technology, equilibrium entails 
the grand coalition of foragers, a cooperative structure which avoids over-exploitation 
of the environment. But at a critical state of technology, the cooperative structure 
breaks down through an individually rational splintering of the band. At this stage, 
there can be an increase in work and through the over-exploitation of the 
environment, a food crisis. In the end, technological growth may lead to a one-way 
transition from foraging to agriculture. 
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“People did not invent agriculture and shout for joy. They drifted or were forced into it, protesting
all the way.” Tudge (1998, p.3)
1 Introduction
One traditional chronology for world pre-history is based on geological epochs or the idea of a
great ice age in the distant past (the Pleistocene epoch). Pre-historic time is partitioned into the
Pleistocene, starting approximately 1.7 million years before present (BP), followed by the warm
Holocene for the last 10,000 years. The Pleistocene is further partitioned into the lower, middle
and upper periods, upper being more recent than lower. The idea of a great ice age has been
modified with the recognition that there was not one but four major glacial periods during the long
Pleistocene.
It is also usual for archaeologists to break prehistory into archaeological stages or lithic (“stone”)
ages (see Renfrew and Bahn (2000 p.125)). Three ages are traditionally recognized: the Paleolithic,
a period which began with the first evidence of stone tools about two million years ago; then in
Europe the Mesolithic which began about 13,000 BP and lasted for about 6,000 years; and finally
the Neolithic which ended with the bronze age.1 The distinction between the Paleolithic and the
Neolithic is the mode of food production, in particular, hunting and gathering (foraging) in the
former, and agriculture in the latter. The Mesolithic was a transitional and rather unstable period
of broad spectrum foraging and the earliest agriculture (e.g. cultivation). The long Paleolithic
period is further subdivided into periods according to the type of stone tool use.2 The potential
utility of an economic approach to Archaeological issues becomes clear when one considers that the
distinction between the stone ages is economic structure and the chronological partitioning of the
Paleolithic is by the state of technology.
For more than 99% of the last two million years foraging was the principal mode of food
production. However, agriculture emerged independently in a number of dispersed locations in the
world within a few thousand years during the early Holocene. Our explanation of this phenomenon
will be driven by technological growth. A central problem in the foraging life-style was the common
access environmental problem. We will show the technological growth may have eventually damaged
1The equivalent terms to Mesolithic for the Near East is Epipalaeolithic, and for North and South America is
Archaic.
2It should be pointed out that the Paleolithic involved more than one type of hominid not all of which our
ancestors. For example it includes the Neanderthal and earlier periods include hominids of smaller cranial capacity.
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the ability of foragers to form conserving institutions (bands) in avoiding over–exploitation. We
will then show how agriculture and private property could come to dominate even though it may
initially provide a lower quality of life.
The study of how we became farmers thousands of years ago is, in itself, interesting. But the
mechanism that we identify in this paper may also prove useful in explaining the recent success
or failure of informal common property resource management systems. Ostrom (1990) provided
case studies of a large number of communities smoothly managing a common property by use of
such informal resource management institutions. These institutions have typically evolved to their
current structure over a long period of time. Key to the success of these institutions — as measured
by the fact that the resource has not been depleted — is their design which ensures and fosters
cooperation within the community. Examples of resources that have been successfully managed
include fisheries, drinking water, and irrigation systems. But Ostrom is aware that these informal
institutions are fragile. When discussing the impact of technological progress, she points out that
it can destabilize and even destroy informal institutions: “... the management of complex resource
systems depends on a delicate balance between the technologies in use and the entry and authority
rules used to control access and use. If the adaptation of new technologies is accelerated, the
relationship between the rules and technologies in use may become seriously unbalanced. This is
particularly the case when the rules have come about through long processes of trial and error
(...) The rapid introduction of a ‘more efficient’ technology can trigger (...) the ‘tragedy of the
commons’ ...” [Ostrom 1990, p.241, note 29].
Indeed, there are cases where a resource management institution operated well for a period of
time and then collapsed after the introduction of a new technology, triggering a ‘tragedy of the
commons’. One such failure, documented by Cordell and McKean (1992), concerns the management
of a fish stock by small communities on the coast of Bahia in Brazil. The story they recount is
similar to that developed in this paper. Until 1970, these communities, through a traditional and
complex system of sea tenure, were able to avoid over–exploitation of their stock of fish. But
in the early 1970s, nylon nets — an improvement over the traditional fishing technology — were
introduced when the Brazilian government started providing loans and tax incentives for fishery
development. The system of sea tenure rapidly collapsed and this in turn triggered a destructive
tragedy of the commons. Cordell and McKean report that since then, the stock of fish has been
gravely depleted.
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Before turning to a complete description of our theory, it is useful to review the alternative
theories that have been put forward to explain the transition from foraging to early agriculture.
2 Theories of the Transition
The information reported here comes from archaeology and studies of modern foragers and other
primates.3
The 19th century theory for the transition which dominated up to the 1950s was that life as
forager was short, nasty, and brutish. Pleistocene humans could not produce a surplus above
subsistence and therefore spent all their time trying to get enough to eat in chronic hunger and
sickness. The moment some genius thought of planting seeds the switch was made.
This theory has been rejected by archeologists and anthropologists (see Megarry (1995, p.225)).
Serious inconsistencies came to light with studies of the fossil record and of modern foraging bands.
These showed that the quality of life under foraging may well have been quite high, what Sahlins
(1968) described as the original aﬄuent society. The “cavemen” were skilled artisans who often
lived in artifactual shelters rather than caves. Archaeology shows that they lived in semi–nomadic
groups or bands of 10–100 individuals. By the upper Pleistocene, they had a highly developed stone
technology (spear throwers, bow and arrow, very refined stone, antler, and bone blades and points)
which allowed them to successfully hunt and butcher the largest animals (mammoths, horses, deer,
reindeer, and bison) (Harris (1977, p.10), Smith (1975, p.729–735)). The idea that Pleistocene
foragers worked around the clock has also come in for criticism. Primate studies and studies of
modern forager societies living under even quite harsh conditions have shown that they may well
have worked less than early agriculturalists and maybe less than we do today (Harris (1977, p.12)
and Haviland (1993, p.154)). Cashdan (1989) who studied the !Kung of South Africa’s Kalahari
desert reports 3 hours per day in foraging time. With repair of equipment and the equivalent of
our housework she reports a 40 hour work week. There is also evidence that these bands knew
how to conserve resources to avoid over exploitation (Harris (1977, p.12) and (1993, p.159)). To
offer one example, one of the responsibilities of the leader of a native community of the Northwest
coast of North America was to decide when to open the salmon fishing season (Johnson and Earle
3Because our focus is on the transition between hunting and gathering and the earliest agriculture the information
for hunting and gathering will be in regard to the late Upper Pleistocene (Upper Paleolithic) which began approxi-
mately 35,000 years ago. For the same reason we are not primarily focused on the much studied issue of domestication
of plants and animals which followed the earliest agriculture or cultivation and animal husbandry
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(1987, p.167)). Foragers also knew how to store food when conditions permitted. Another element
which is considered almost a defining characteristic of band life is food sharing. Sharing or gift
exchange (reciprocity) is seen by many anthropologists as promoting cooperation (fictive kinship
relationships) among genealogically unrelated individuals (Johnson and Earle (1987, p.6)).4 In
economics, the idea of reciprocity and cooperation was introduced by Akerlof (1983) in his analysis
of labour contracts. More recently, Carmichael and MacLeod (1997) have shown, in an evolutionary
model, how gift giving can lead to trust and cooperation.
Archaeological evidence suggests that the forager’s physical health was good implying good
levels of consumption. Angel (1975) studying skeletal remains from the late upper Pleistocene
found that these people grew taller and had less tooth loss than all but the most recent humans.
Renfrew and Bahn (2000, p.452), commenting on a number of studies, conclude that there seems to
be a pattern of reduced mechanical stress (injuries) and increased infections and nutritional stress
with the adoption of agriculture. Harris (1977, p.4) references studies which conclude that life
expectancy conditional on birth for modern foragers (!Kung bushmen) and non-white American
males in 1900 was the same, 32.5 years. It is argued that this is associated with extremely low
population densities throughout the Pleistocene (Harris (1977, p.14) and below). Finally, it is
also known that pre–historic foragers lived side by side with farmers (Cashdan (1989, p.44)) which
implies that the foraging life–style in some cases was a choice.
More recent theories for the transition are based on some combination of population pressure
and environmental change. The theories differ in causation and emphasis but most of them have a
food crisis as an element in the transition from foraging to agriculture.
The extreme population pressure view captured in Malthusian models of uncontrolled popula-
tion pressure leading to a subsidence existence and which is related to pre–1950’s theory, would
be rejected by most modern anthropologists. First, as pointed out above there is a good deal of
evidence that leisure and in fact the quality of life during the late Upper Pleistocene was quite high
and possibly higher than during the early Holocene. Second, there is agreement among anthropol-
ogists and archaeologists that Pleistocene peoples controlled their populations (see Birdsell (1968),
Harris (1977, chapter 2), Cohen (1980), Hassan (1980), Lee (1980), Ripley (1980), Harris (1993,
4Kinship theory (the selfish gene) explains why an individual may cooperate with his kin. Cultural anthropologists
argue that culture can create the fictive belief that genetically unrelated individuals are kin. An example of the cultural
device that can be used to create these beliefs is the individuals undertaking behaviour that is typical of kin, such as
reciprocity.
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chapter 13), and Megarry (1995, p.221)). Population control during the Pleistocene is reflected in
it being a period of extremely low population growth. Cohen (1980) and Renfrew and Bahn (2000)
report annual population growth of .001–.003% during the Pleistocene with a hundred fold increase
during the Holocene and a 1000 fold increase in modern times. Renfrew and Bahn report a world
population in the 5-20 million range at the end of the Pleistocene
Methods of population control which were available to Pleistocene people included culturally–
demanded abstinence, disruption of the menstrual cycle through extended years of breast–feeding,
abortion, direct and indirect infanticide (particularly female infanticide), child homicide, and even
dietary cannibalism.5 Among modern foragers levels of infanticide have been estimated to be as
high as 50% (Birdsell (1968, p.243)). Hassan (1980) suggests percentages in the area of 25–35%.
Hill and Hurtado (1996) reports evidence of child homicide among modern foragers.
Clearly besides the issue of feasibility of population control there is also the issue of individual
incentive. It has been argued that woman in foraging societies had strong incentives to have few
dependent children because of the problem, if not impossibility, of carrying all possessions, gathered
food and more than one child over the great distances traveled in a foraging life-style (Lee (1980)).6
The psychological stress of infanticide may have been eased by culturally defining the start of
human life long after birth in much the same way we ease the stress of abortion by defining the
start of human life long after conception. The stress of child homicide may have been eased by
the idea that the homicide would provide companions for a dead adult. Further, given the band
organization, the infanticide or homicide decision simply may not have been a private one (see
Hill and Hurtado (1996) for public decision on child homicide within Ache bands). There are also
arguments that infanticide may have been adaptive evolutionary behaviour (Ripley (1980)).
Agriculture emerged independently in at least seven distinct locations in the world within
a few thousand years (see Smith (1995)). It then seemed natural to look at exogenous global
environmental shocks as a central element in theories of the transition (e.g. Childe (1952)). The
end of the Pleistocene corresponds to the end of the last ice age. The ice retreated and there was a
global warming with a rising sea level. The warming led to a forestation of former vast grasslands
5The emphasis on female infanticide arises from the number of females being the important population growth
variable in societies without monogamous relationships. See Harris (1993, chapter 13) for a discussion of indirect
infanticide in modern societies. On dietary cannibalism, see the discussion in the working paper version of this paper,
Marceau and Myers (2000).
6This explanation is also consistent with the dramatic increases in population with the adoption of a sedentary
life-style and agriculture.
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which had covered much of southern Eurasia and which had supported the Pleistocene megafauna
(e.g. mammoth). Through some combination of hunting and environmental change, these animals
became extinct during this period and this was a force in the switch to agriculture (see Renfrew
and Bahn (2000), p. 252-253 on the extinctions, and Smith and Wishnie (2000) on conservation
and over exploitation). In recent decades, however, the complexity of environmental change in
the Pleistocene has been recognized. During the Pleistocene there were four major glacials and
approximately twenty stadials (more minor distinct cold periods) (see Renfrew and Bahn (2000),
p.125-126). As a result an environmental explanation on its own has been unconvincing because
similar climatic events had occurred many times during the Pleistocene without the megafauna
going extinct and without sparking agriculture.7
Recognition of the difficulties with either population growth or an environmental shock as the
cause of the transition seems to have led to increasingly complex explanations which are built on
combining elements of environmental change and population pressure. In this line Binford (1968)
and Flannery (1969) were extended to include sedentism as a central component by Bar Yosef and
Kislev (1989, p.633–634) in studying the emergence of agriculture in the Jordan Valley around
10,000 BP. That explanation runs as follows (see also Bar-Yosef and Belfer-Cohen (1989) and Bar-
Yosef and Meadow (1995, p.65–71)). Between 19,000 BP and 14,500 BP, small bands of hunter-
gatherers occupied the Mediterranean coastal ranges and the western sector of the Trans-Jordanian
plateau. The inner land was cold and dry, thereby limiting expansion in that direction. The way
of life was mobile because of the spatial and seasonal distribution of resources. Between 14,500 BP
and 12,500 BP, a climatic change towards more rainfall caused dispersion of the population to a
much wider area and the associated increase in resources lead to a larger total population of mobile
foragers. Around 12,500 BP, an abrupt climatic change towards drier conditions caused the return of
foragers established inland, back into the Mediterranean coastal territories. Because of the sudden
increase in population density, and the occupation of all resourceful territories, it became impossible
to continue the mobile way of life. This lead to sedentism and the adoption of a broad spectrum
diet. From 12,000 BP to 11,000 BP, the Natufians — i.e. the residents of this geographical area
during this particular era — were based in sedentary villages and expanded in some drier territories,
7There are also economists who have also been arguing for an explanation based on global environmental events.
Ofek (2001) argues that there was increased climatic stability starting about 11,000 years ago and this stability was
necessary for the viability of agriculture. He also argues that trade or exchange allowed early farmers to specialize
in production while maintaining consumption diversity. He argues that it was a lack of exchange (attempts at self-
sufficiency) that explain the serious decline in health evidenced in skeletal remains at the time of early agriculture.
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possibly because of population growth associated with now more sedentary lifestyle. Between 10,500
BP and 10,000 BP, the climate changed towards even drier conditions and the available resources,
despite the broad spectrum diet, were probably fluctuating at dangerously low levels in some
years. Because they could no longer move to other nearby resourceful territories, the risk-reduction
strategy the Natufians adopted was to switch to agriculture systematically, particularly when the
climate began to improve.
This compelling theory of the transition — and variants of it — has had a significant influence
on the thinking of many archaeologists (see Flannery (1986) and Marcus and Flannery (1996) on
the transition for the Oaxaca Valley in Mexico, Piperno (1989) on the Panamanian tropical forests,
Smith (1995) on Central and South America, or Higham (1995) on Southeast Asia). But it also has
it critics. Price and Gebauer, 1995, p.7 argue that population growth and environmental shocks
are probably not sufficient to generate the kind of stress that sparked agriculture. McCorriston and
Hole (1991), also studying the Jordan valley, add appropriate technology (ability to store food and
other goods) and cultural or social developments to population pressure and a changed environment
to the list of causal factors for the transition.8
We would also like to suggest some further considerations. A central element in the works of
Bar-Yosef and his co-authors is sedentism. It is widely accepted that sedentism leads to population
growth but in the theories above, increased population densities also caused increased sedentism
and this, is much more open to debate. First there is no discussion of the possibility of population
control and there is the well-known case of a transition in which population growth came only after
increased sedentism (see Section 8.4 on the Tehuacan Valley in Mexico). Also, the central element
in this work is environmental change, as it is the improving then worsening environment which
leads to the increased population density which then leads to sedentism. A basic weakness of this
explanation is that the quality of the environment is a cyclical variable. The environment at the
end of the Pleistocene must be sufficiently unique in pre-history to generate the transition at that
particular point and not earlier. It turns out that the warming trend was dramatic but it was likely
not temporally unique, even in the last 135,000 years (see Renfrew and Bahn (2000) p.227 on the
previous interglacial). Further it must not be too unique globally otherwise it would be inconsistent
with the transition independently taking place in a number of diverse locations and environments
8The environmental characteristic emphasized by these authors is extreme seasonality in the availability of re-
sources rather than the longer term environmental trends of Bar-Yosef and his co-authors.
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around the world at approximately the same point in prehistory.
We have no doubt that the ”truth” about the transition is that it was caused by multiple
factors, but we also point out that there is one variable which is not inherently cyclical (like the
environment), which is not directly controllable (like population size), which is global in sweep
and which was at it prehistoric highest level at end of the Pleistocene. It is what these people
”knew”, specifically, the state of their technology. The growth of technology can be explained by
Foley’s (1987) human evolution towards improved physical or cognitive abilities or by learning by
doing with the knowledge passed down through the generations.9 As noted above the state of stone
technology was used to partition the Paleolithic.
3 The Early Holocene as a Breakdown of Community
We will not rely on environmental shocks and we will diverge from existing economic work on
archaeological issues in which population pressure was a key factor (e.g. Brander and Taylor
(1998), and to a lesser extent Locay (1989)) and assume that the population is fixed. We will also
not rely on environmental change. At the heart of our approach will be technological growth.10
When an economist considers the Pleistocene the common property characteristic of the eco-
nomic structure is evident. We will follow earlier economists and use a standard model of renewable
resource for the foraging economy (section 6.2). But we will diverge from existing work, such as
Smith (1975), and assume that foragers had the ability to organize themselves into cooperative
communities (bands).11 The purpose of the band in our model is to conserve and thus avoid over–
exploitation of the environment. We first define a band (coalition) as a non–empty subset of the
individuals and a band structure (coalition structure) as a partition of the set of individuals into
9For a discussion of the increased degree of refinement in stone tool manufacture see Renfrew and Bahn (2000
p.319-320).
10Locay (1989) builds a model in which technological growth can lead to the transition from foraging to agriculture,
but the mechanism that induces the transition in his analysis is very different from ours. His explanation is based on
the relative intensity of land and labour in producing food under foraging and agriculture. Foraging being relatively
intensive in land while agriculture is relatively intensive in labour, an increase in the productivity of agriculture,
equivalent to making labour more abundant (less efficiency units of labour are required per unit of output), can lead
to the transition from foraging to agriculture. Locay also points out that if, for some reason, the number of children
increases before the transition, then the density of population increases, land becomes relatively more scarce, and the
transition to agriculture becomes more likely.
11For this purpose, we use the model of coalition formation developed by Burbidge et al. (1997) which is strongly
related to Hart and Kurz (1983). While we do not use the alternative model developed by Ray and Vohra (1997,
1999), we show in the working paper version of the current analysis (Marceau and Myers, 2000) that our primary
results would obtain if we used their approach.
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coalitions. We assume that to join a band is an individual’s agreement to put its production de-
cisions under the control of the band and to share the resources of the band equally. We assume
that the decision to join the band and cooperate or to not join the band and compete is voluntary
and rational (section 5).
Some preliminary results on the foraging economy are provided in section 6.3: 1) given the state
of technology, cooperation is good for society; 2) cooperation becomes more important for society as
technology improves; and 3) given the state of cooperation (i.e. the coalition structure), technology
growth is good for society. Consider the third result in the case of the grand coalition. Because
we assume foragers are well informed and can avoid waste (externalities) through cooperation, any
technological improvements simply allow foragers to produce more from less and thus must be good
for society. This result then implies that if we are to provide a theory which is consistent with
the collapse of well-being during the early Holocene, with roots in technological improvements, it
must come from a breakdown in cooperation. We also provide a simple model of agriculture, the
primary difference between foraging and agriculture being the private nature of property under
agriculture (section 6.1). Thus a band is associated with both a set of individuals and a mode of
food production.
In our model individual participation decisions lead to an equilibrium band structure. Because
mixed structures of both foraging and agricultural bands are feasible in our model, we must spec-
ify the interaction (externalities) between such groups. We assume that large bands of foragers
impose a security cost on smaller bands of farmers (and foragers)12 and that farmers through
their employment of land in farming reduce the carrying capacity of the environment available to
foragers.
In section 7 we provide our main results. At the lowest levels of technology we show that
the unique equilibrium band structure is the grand band of foragers — cooperation of the whole.
As technology grows, leisure, consumption, and thereby utility increase. But at a critical level of
technology the cooperation structure breaks down through a splintering of the foraging band. The
logic of this result is simple. The conservation undertaken by the grand band is like the provision
of a public good. And we show that the incentive of a small band to break away and hunt at an
individually rational level, while free riding on the conservation undertaken by the others, increases
12That warfare was in the past a common practice is discussed in Harris (1977, chapters 4 and 5). Chagnon (1968)
has documented the state of perpetual warfare of the Yanomano¨s, a group of modern foragers living in the forests
along the border between Brazil and Venezuela.
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with the state of technology.
To show how the collapse of the grand band of foragers can eventually lead to a transition from
foraging to agriculture, a numerical example is presented. We show that at the critical state of
technology at which the grand band of foragers is broken down, there is a catastrophic increase
in work, decrease in consumption and through the over–exploitation of the environment, a food
crisis.13 Having explained the occurrence of a food crisis and a drop in utility for foragers, we
then illustrate the switch from foraging to agriculture. As will be seen, the transitional period
can involve mixed coalition structures of both foraging bands and agricultural bands and, in some
cases, it can involve no equilibrium structure, which we interpret as transitory instability.
Possibly the best natural context for the application of our work is a geographically isolated
territory which confines interaction to a fixed set of individuals or families. In our story, the whole
of some given territory is initially exploited by a grand band and so, provided there is cooperation
within the band, there is no over-exploitation of the environment. However, when a splintering of
the grand band takes place, a number of smaller bands have to share the available space, each band
occupying and exploiting a portion (sub-territory) of the initial territory. Thus, the emergence
of defined sub-territories — the phenomenon of “territoriality” — occurs when the grand band
splinters. As was mentioned above, and as is developed below, if the various bands act in a non-
cooperative fashion, over-exploitation of the environment may then occur.14
The Anthropological literature is full of examples of such “closed” geographies: the Tehuacan
Valley of Mexico (see Harris, 1977 p.23-25) or Easter Island (see Brander and Taylor, 1998). Both
of these geographically isolated territories are heavily studied and provide examples of societies
being hurt by environmental depletion. In Section 8, we discuss in details the case of the Tehuacan
Valley of Mexico and we argue that the events which took place there between 12,000 BP and 5,400
BP are consistent with the theory we develop below.
13What we mean by catastrophic is a discrete jump in the value of an endogenous variables due to a marginal
change in an exogenous variable. In our model the food crisis does not lead to extinctions, but with very minor
modifications of the open access model in section 6.2 the result could be extinction.
14In an influential paper, Dyson-Hudson and Smith (1977) develop the “economic defensibility model” which
identifies (non-formally) the ecological circumstances (resource density and resource predictability) under which
various types of territoriality emerge. Baker (2003) formalizes and improves this model. He argues that tenure
regimes vary: boundaries may, in some cases, be imprecise, but in others, they may be clearly defined; the boundaries
of territories may be aggressively protected while in other cases, they may be transgressed easily. Baker shows how
different ecological conditions can explain the emergence of the various types of land tenure. However, neither Dyson-
Hudson and Smith (1977) nor Baker (2003) do take into account the impact of land tenure on the environment, which
is partly the focus of our paper.
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In summary and at the risk of over–interpreting a rather simple model, our results are broadly
consistent with the information discussed in the previous section. First, there is a one way transition
from the foraging to the agriculture through a transitional period characterized by mixed economic
structures and instability. The transition being driven by the well–documented technological growth
with a drop in the well–being of individuals at the collapse due to a food crisis and over–exploitation
of the environment.
4 An Overview of Band Formation
Throughout there will be two goods; food and leisure. We define Ci as consumption of food and
Zi the consumption of leisure by individual i. The individual has an endowment of time T which
is divided between Zi, labour Li and enforcement or security effort Mi, so that the individual time
constraint is T = Li+ Zi+Mi.We will assume that the preferences for an individual are represented
by a perfect substitutes utility function or
U(Ci, Zi) = Ci + Zi = Ci + T − Li −Mi (1)
The simplicity of this form will allow us to solve for all endogenous variables at equilibrium in
closed form and to still bring out the primary qualitative conclusions.15
We begin with a set of identical individuals or N = {1, .., i, .., n}. We assume that individuals
are a member of one and only one band and that bands are homogenous in their mode of produc-
tion, thus an individual must be either a forager or a farmer.16 A coalition of individuals (band)
employing food production mode f = A,H is defined as a nonempty subset of N denoted Sfj , with
A and H denoting agriculture and hunting-gathering, respectively. A coalition structure is defined
as a partition of N and is denoted B and the set of all possible coalition structures is denoted B.
We denote the set of farming bands in B as BA = {SA1 , ..SAj , .., SAm′} and denote the set of foraging
bands in B as BH = {SH1 , ..SHj , .., SHm′′}. So B = BA ∪BH .
We assume that to join a band is an individual’s agreement to put its labour supply decision
under the control of the band leader and to share the food resources of the band according to the
band’s sharing rule. The labour supplied for food production and security and food consumed in
15A numerical example for Cobb–Douglas preferences is available upon request (see also footnote 31).
16While there is some justification for this strong assumption, it is made for simplicity. Our model of homogeneous
individuals does not allow for phenomena such as sex-based labour specialization within a band or the gradual
transition of a given band from foraging to farming.
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aggregate by a coalition Sfj in B is denoted by LSfj (B) and CSfj (B) respectively. The dependence
of these on B, not just Sfj , allows for externalities across coalitions in a coalitional structure. For
example, the labour supplied by one foraging band may affect what is feasible for another band.
The labour supplied and the consumption of an individual i ∈ Sfj ∈ B is denoted L
f
i (B) and C
f
i (B).
We have assumed that individuals are economically indistinguishable in terms of endowments and
preferences so we will assume that the band sharing rule is to divide work and food equally amongst
members or Lfi (B) ≡ LSfj (B)/
∣∣∣Sfj
∣∣∣ and Cfi (B) ≡ CSfj (B)/
∣∣∣Sfj
∣∣∣ where
∣∣∣Sfj
∣∣∣ is the cardinality of the
set Sfj .17
There are two stages in the overall game: the band–formation stage; and the band–competition
stage. In the second stage bands are already in place. We assume that the decisions of a band
are coordinated by its leader to cooperatively maximize the total utility of the band; USfj (B) =
CSfj (B) +
∣∣∣Sfj
∣∣∣T − LSfj (B) −MSfj (B). The underlying economies involve strategic interaction so
we will assume that the play across bands is non–cooperative. Thus at the second stage, members
of each band cooperatively play a game in strategic form against other bands to maximize USfj (B)
yielding an equilibrium U∗
Sfj
(B) for the second stage, which is then allocated to i ∈ Sfj by the equal
division rule yielding Uf∗i (B) = CSfj (B)/
∣∣∣Sfj
∣∣∣+ T − LSfj (B)/
∣∣∣Sfj
∣∣∣−MSfj (B)/
∣∣∣Sfj
∣∣∣ .18
Looking ahead to that stage from the first stage, each individual will have a set of preferences
(payoffs) over all possible coalition structures, Uf∗i (B) for all B ∈ B. Based on these preferences
self–interested individuals in the band formation stage form coalitions which lead to a coalition
structure and thus a payoff for each player i, U∗i (B)
We now proceed with the formal description of the two stages starting with the first.
5 The Band Formation Stage
We start with the set of individuals N and model how these players acting in their own self interest,
might choose to align themselves into bands. The approach we will follow is a modification of the
approach which can be found in Burbidge et. al. (1997, section V).
With cognizance of the band competition stage the players know Uf∗i (B) for all B ∈ B, that
17As noted in the introduction food sharing is often considered a defining characteristic of hunting and gathering
bands. Further as we will explain below it will turn out that our primary results are independent of a specific sharing
rule.
18The superscript f in Uf∗i (B) is actually redundant, because once i and B are identified, S
f
j 3 i is identified and
thus the mode of production employed by i is identified. But we will include the superscript to improve clarity.
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is, they would have a preference ordering over all possible coalition structures, B. We use these
preference orderings to construct a game in strategic form for this stage.
We view the group of individuals engaging in non–binding pre–play communication during which
possible options for coalition formation are weighed and potential partners sought. Eventually, each
player comes to formulate a plan for joining a set of partners. A strategy of player i will be identified
with a partnership plan for player i: it is a choice of a mode of production and a coalition to which
i wants to belong.19 Formally, a strategy for player i is a mode of production fi = A,H and a
subset of N or Sfii with i ∈ S
fi
i . A combination of choices of participation plans or strategies (one
for each player), s = (Sf11 , ..., S
fi
i , ..., S
fn
n ), will be referred to as a profile of partnership plans or a
strategy profile. The set of all partnership plans for player i will be denoted by Si; S = ×i∈N Si
will stand for the set of all profiles of partnership plans.
How any given profile of partnership plans s ∈ S gets reconciled into a resultant coalition
structure is summarized by a function, ψ : S → B that assigns to any s ∈ S a unique coalition
structure B = ψ(s). We call the function ψ the coalition structure rule. Informally, the rule ψ
is meant to capture the players’ expectations, assumed to be commonly held and correct. The
question, then, is: what is a sensible modeling choice for the function ψ in the context of our band
formation game? In Burbidge et. al. (1997) a rather wide class of rules and two specific rules
within that class are discussed. But in this paper we will focus on one of the two rules labeled the
similarity rule by Burbidge et. al. (1997).20 It is the rule which seems best suited to an application
of band formation as we will explain below.
First, given any i ∈ N and s ∈ S, let ψi(s) denote the coalition to which i belongs in the
coalition structure ψ(s) resulting from the profile s.
Call the coalition structure rule ψ̂ : S→ B the similarity rule if for any strategy profile s ∈ S,
and any i ∈ N , we have:
ψ̂i(s) = {j ∈ N | Sfii = S
fj
j }
Thus under the similarity rule if two or more players have the same partnership plan those
players are assigned into the same coalition. If a player does not share a plan with any other
agent that player is alone. In effect we are interpreting a player’s partnership plan as a mode of
19The modification of Burbidge et al. (1997) is that a partnership plan for i was simply a coalition to which i
wanted to belong. There was no choice over modes of production.
20The rule corresponds to the δ model in Hart and Kurz (1983).
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production and the largest set of partners it is willing to be associated with in a coalition.21
We now have a well–defined game in strategic form. The coalitional players are the set N of
individuals; the set of strategies available to each player i ∈ N consists of all possible partnership
plans, Si; every strategy profile s induces a coalition structure ψ̂(s) = {SA1 , ..., SAm′ , SH1 , ..., SHm′′}
through the similarity rule, and thus a payoff for each player i ∈ N of Uf∗i (ψ̂(s)). We call the game
at this stage the band formation game.
We want to identify a coalition structure B as an “equilibrium” structure if B = ψ̂(s) for an
“equilibrium” strategy profile s for the band formation game. Within our framework, an attractive
solution concept is that of coalition proof Nash equilibrium (CPE), due to Bernheim, Peleg and
Whinston (1987). Roughly, a strategy profile is coalition proof if no set of players, taking the
strategies of its complement as fixed, can fashion a profitable deviation for each of its members
that is itself immune to further deviations by subsets of the deviating coalition. We refer the reader
to the original article for a formal definition. Because the set of CPE is a subset of the set of NE,
it should be noted that any CPE is a NE.
To summarize, we call a coalition structure B a CPE equilibrium coalition structure or equilib-
rium outcome if B = ψ̂(s) for a CPE strategy profile s for the band formation game.
6 The Band Competition Stage
At this second stage the coalition or band structure is already given. Given B, we will now layout
the underlying economies for agriculture and foraging, and their interrelationships. We are working
towards Uf∗i (B) for all B ∈ B. We begin with the simpler agricultural model.
6.1 Agricultural Model
We assume that the farming activities of one farmer has no impact on the payoff of other farmers,
whether those other farmers are members of the same band or not. This implies that there is
no gain to farmers cooperating in their production decisions through forming a band. Thus we
assume that a farmer makes his own production decisions. The sole purpose of joining a band for
21This allows a player to exclude any other set of players by not having those players in their plan. Further, there
will be a unique s which leads to the formation of the grand coalition engaged in a mode of production — the s given
by Sfii = N
fi and fh = fi for all h, i ∈ N, which we denote sfN . To assume otherwise would be to assume that a
grand coalition could form without unanimous consent. See Burbidge et al. (1997) for further discussion of this rule.
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a farmer is sharing security costs.22 We will allow for the possibility that farmers face a security
cost associated with the existence of individuals outside of their community who pose a security
threat. We assume the security cost of the agricultural band SAj is in terms of time and is denoted
as MSAj (B). We will assume that all members of a farming band equally share the security cost of
the band.
Agricultural output is produced according to technology φf(li, Ei), with positive but decreasing
marginal products, and where φ is an agricultural technological parameter, li is the time spent by
individual i in the fields, and Ei is the amount of land farmed. Agricultural land is freely available
but has to be improved at a labour cost which we assume to be an increasing and weakly convex
function of the amount of land employed, m(Ei), with m′(Ei) > 0 and m′′(Ei) ≥ 0. So the
individual’s labour supply in producing food is Li = li +m(Ei). Thus individual i ∈ SAj ∈ BA,
solves the following problem:
max
li,Ei
Ci + Zi subject to Ci = φf(li, Ei) and Zi + li +m(Ei) +MSAj (B)/|S
A
j | = T
Solving this problem yields a labour supply and a demand for land given by li(φ) and Ei(φ),
respectively.23 These then can be used to yield a solution for utility as a function of φ and through
the security cost, a function of B,24
UA∗i (B) = φf(li(φ), Ei(φ)) + T − li(φ)−m(Ei(φ)) −MSAj (B)/|S
A
j | (2)
The simplicity of the agricultural model yields a great deal of tractability which will be useful in
comparison to the more complicated foraging model. In modeling foraging we will assume the use of
land in agriculture has an adverse effect on the carrying capacity of the environment. Specifically
the carrying capacity of the environment available for foraging is reduced by the use of land in
agriculture.25 Let K¯ be the carrying capacity in the absence of agriculture. Then we assume
22Agriculture generates many possibilities for rational cooperation through the formation of a community other
than security. For example, large community projects like the provision of irrigation infrastructure or a grain grinding
facilities. In fact, some have argued that these projects provided the genesis of the pristine state. But our focus here
is on the transition from hunting and gathering to the earliest agriculture. Thus we will focus on providing a more
complete model for foraging and use a bare bones model for agricultural. The fundamental contrast between foraging
and agriculture which we will emphasize is the private property nature of production in the latter.
23Note that a leader of band SAj choosing li and Ei for all i ∈ SAj to maximize the sum of utilities of all i ∈ SAj
and given the equal sharing rule would also yield the same optimal choices. This simply reflects the point that there
is no gains from the cooperation for farmers other than through the sharing of security costs.
24In the numerical example presented in Section 7, we choose functional forms for f(·) and m(·).
25See Tudge (1998) for a discussion of this interaction.
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the available carrying capacity, K(B), is given by K(B) = K¯ − λF (B), where F (B) is the total
amount of land employed in agriculture and λ ≥ 0 is a parameter that measures the severity of the
externality. Note that below, we interpret a change in K¯ as an environmental shock. In our model
each farmer employs Ei(φ) which is independent of B. This implies that F (B) = Ei(φ)
∑
SAh ∈B
|SAh |,
where
∑
SAh ∈B
|SAh | is the total number of farmers in the coalition structure B. This yields
K(B) = K¯ − λEi(φ)
∑
SAh ∈B
|SAh | (3)
6.2 The Foraging Model
The bands in BH share a stock of animals (or plants) at time t, X(t) which we assume follows a
logistic form or26
X(t) = K(B)
1 + ke−γt
where γ is the intrinsic growth rate and k ≡ (K(B) − X(0))/X(0). This gives a natural growth
rate of the stock of
dX(t)
dt
≡ g(X) = γ
[
1− X
K(B)
]
X
The graph of g(X) against X is described by g(0) = 0 and g(K(B)) = 0 (growth of the stock is zero
at X = K(B) — the environment is too crowded) and the maximizer for g(X) at X = K(B)/2 —
this point is called maximum sustainable yield.27
The band SHj combines labour with the stock to produce food
CSHj (B) = θLSHj (B)X
the catch per unit of effort being proportional to the stock. Parameter θ reflects the state of the
foraging technology. Then the total harvest is
26It should be noted that X through its dependence on K(B) is also a function of the coalition structure B. But
at this second stage B is given. So we do not include it explicitly. We explicitly write K as a function of B because
K will appear in the closed form for UH∗i . We will follow this convention throughout.
27The archaeological record involve the extinction of some animals and more generally a food crisis at the time of
transition. Our model can be easily extended to allow for extinction by using a modified logistic function which gives
g(X) = γ[1− XK ]X
α which is logistic for α = 1 but for α > 1 has g′′(X) > 0 at low enough X. When cooperation will
break down, our model will involve a fall in the stock of animals (i.e. food crisis) and this could involve extinction
with α > 1.
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CH(B) =
∑
SHj ∈BH
CSHj (B) =
∑
SHj ∈BH
θLSHj (B)X = θL
H(B)X where LH(B) =
∑
SHj ∈BH
LSHj (B)
So the growth of the stock with foraging is
•
X = g(X) − CH(B)
The biometric equilibrium, or steady state, is where these are in balance or
•
X = 0 and using the
logistic then
γ
[
1− X
e
K(B)
]
Xe − θLH(B)Xe = 0
or
Xe =
(
1− θL
H(B)
γ
)
K(B) (4)
where Xe is the biometric equilibrium stock as a function of LH(B) (from now, we drop the
superscript e). And the catch for any band in biometric equilibrium is
CSHj (B) = θLSHj (B)
(
1− θL
H(B)
γ
)
K(B) (5)
Notice the externality associated with common access entering through LH(B). This provides the
benefit of cooperation for foragers through the formation of cooperative communities. Further
dCSHj (B)
dLSHj (B)
= θ
(
1− θL
H(B)
γ −
θLSHj (B)
γ
)
K(B) and
d2CSHj (B)
d(LSHj (B))
2 = −2θ
2K(B)/γ < 0 (6)
So the graph of CSHj (B) is described by CSHj (B) = 0 at LSHj (B) = 0, CSHj (B) maximized at
LMaxSHj (B) = γ/2θ −
∑
h 6=jLSHh (B)/2, and CSHj (B) = 0 again at LSHj (B) = 2L
Max
SHj
(B). The feasible
space is strictly convex.
Given the perfect substitutes assumption and (6) a necessary condition for dCSHj (B)/dLSHj (B) >
1 at LSHj (B) = 0, that is a positive labour supply, is θK(B) > 1. We will take care to choose K
sufficiently large to satisfy this requirement throughout.
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To maximize total utility the band leader sets dCSHj (B)/dLSHj (B) = 1. This yields a best
response of28
L∗SHj (B) = I(B)−
∑
SHh ∈BH\S
H
j
LSHh (B)
2
where the summary parameter I(B) = [γ(θK(B)− 1)]/[2θ2K(B)]. By θK(B)−1 > 0, the intercept
I(B) > 0 and the slope of the graph of L∗SHj (B) with respect to LSHh (B) is negative so there is a
unique Nash equilibrium. Notice that the best responses are symmetric in bands which then allows
us to solve for the Nash equilibrium labour supply as
L∗SHj (B) =
2I(B)
1 + |BH |
Using the equal sharing rule, the time constraint (1), (4), and (5) we can solve for the all endogenous
variables at the band competition equilibrium.
LH∗i (B) =
2I(B)∣∣∣SHj
∣∣∣ [1 + |BH |]
(7)
LH∗(B) =
2I(B)
∣∣BH
∣∣
1 + |BH |
XH∗(B) =
[
1−
2θ
∣∣BH
∣∣ I(B)
γ[1 + |BH |]
]
K(B)
CH∗i (B) = θ

 2I(B)∣∣∣SHj
∣∣∣ [1 + |BH |]


[
1−
2θ
∣∣BH
∣∣ I(B)
γ[1 + |BH |]
]
K(B)
ZH∗i (B) = T −
2TI(B)∣∣∣SHj
∣∣∣ [1 + |BH |]
−
MSHj (B)∣∣∣SHj
∣∣∣
UH∗i (B) = T +
2I(B)[θK(B)− 1]
[1 + |BH |]2
∣∣∣SHj
∣∣∣
−
MSHj (B)∣∣∣SHj
∣∣∣
where the last equation was simplified using the definition of I(B). With (2) and (7) we now have
a solution for Uf∗i (B) for all B ∈ B and thus f = A,H.
28Note that the second order condition is satisfied and that the same first order condition is implied by the band
leader choosing LSHj (B) or Li(B) for all i ∈ S
H
j separately.
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6.3 Some Preliminary Results for a Foraging Economy
Before working to determine an equilibrium coalition structure, we will provide some preliminary
results on the relationship between the well–being in a foraging society, technological growth and
cooperation. Here, to focus on a foraging society (the Pleistocene) we assume BA = ∅. Then
BH = B, Sfj = SHj , and K(B) = K so we denote SHj = Sj for simplicity.
First, the total utility for all individuals in a band Sj
TU∗Sj (B) =
∑
i∈Sj
U∗i (B) = |Sj| T +
2I(B)[θK(B)− 1]
[1 + |B|]2
−MSj (B)
and then the total utility for all individuals in a coalition structure
TU∗(B) =
∑
Sj∈B
TU∗Sj (B) = |N |T +
2 |B| I(B)[θK(B)− 1]
[1 + |B|]2
−
∑
Sj∈B
MSj (B) (8)
Below we will argue that a reasonable specification for MSj (B) would involve there being non–
zero security costs at least for bands which are non-maximal in the coalition structure (i.e. bands
which run the risk of running into larger bands of competitors carrying lethal weapons). Thus we
will argue that a cost of non–cooperative societies with more than one band is the security cost,
but for now we assume that MSj (B) = 0 for all Sj ∈ B and for all B ∈ B.
Because the act of joining a band is choosing to cooperate with other individuals we will
assume that forming larger bands implies a more cooperative society, specifically, we define a
more cooperative society to be one with a smaller |B|. The extreme examples are the grand
coalition B = {N} with |B| = 1 where everyone chooses to cooperate and the singleton coalition
B = {{1}, {2}, . . . , {n}} with |B| = |N | where everyone is non–cooperative.
The first observation arises from the environmental externalities.
Observation 1: For any given level of technology θ, cooperation is good for the foraging society.
Using (8), the total utility gap between two coalitions structures B′ and B′′ which differ by |B′| −
|B′′| < 0 so that B′ is more cooperative
TU∗(B′)− TU∗(B′′) = 2I(B)[θK(B)− 1]
[1 + |B′|]2 [1 + |B′′|]2
[∣∣B′
∣∣−
∣∣B′′
∣∣] [1−
∣∣B′
∣∣ ∣∣B′′
∣∣] > 0 (9)
When B′ = {N} for example this result reflects the fact that only in the grand band will there
be efficient labour supply decisions (all externalities are internalized). That the grand band domi-
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nates other coalition structures, in this sense, would simply be reinforced by introducing non–zero
MSj (B), as long as one were to make the reasonable assumption that security costs would be less
in the grand band than for other coalition structures as there are simply no competitors in that
structure.
Because an improvement in technology allows more consumption with no decrease in leisure,
one would expect that technological growth is good for a society.
Observation 2: For any given degree of cooperation (i.e. given a coalition structure) an increase
in technology is good for the foraging society.
The derivative of TU∗(B) from (8) with respect to θ is positive.
This result implies that if we are to provide a theory of the collapse in well being during the
Early Holocene with roots in technological improvements, it must come from a change in coalition
structure that leads to a finer coalition structure, that is, less cooperation
Observation 3: As technology increases cooperation becomes more important for society.
The derivative of TU∗(B′)− TU∗(B′′) from (9) with respect to θ is positive. Thus the importance
to a society of cooperative behaviour grows with technology
But as we shall see below these positive observations about cooperation and technological growth
do not preclude the possibility that technological growth can lead to a potentially catastrophic (in
the mathematical sense) deterioration in the well–being of a society. Technological growth can lead
to a splintering of a foraging community and thus a breakdown of cooperation.
7 Equilibrium Transitions
Our approach to the transition from foraging to agriculture will be based on the exogenous tech-
nological growth over time. Each production mode is characterized by a technological parameter:
θ for foraging and φ for agriculture. These are modeling choices. For example, it would be possible
to assume starting values such that the initial equilibrium state is agriculture. Because we want
our model to be consistent with the fact that the world started with a pure foraging economy, we
begin with an assumption.
A.1: In the earliest of times (low enough θ > 1/K(B)) agriculture is simply not viable.
This could be formalized by assuming that for low enough θ > 1/K(B), φ = 0 in which case,
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no agricultural production will take place.29
But eventually, we think it is natural to assume that improvements in the foraging technology
spill over as improvements in the agricultural technology. Note that there are stages in either
production process which are similar, for example, the butchering of a carcass or the grinding of
grains. Thus the development of very sharp blades for butchering during the upper Pleistocene,
clearly was an important positive technological development for agriculture. Formally, we will
assume that there is some θ > 1/K(B) denoted θ, where agriculture becomes viable (e.g. φ
becomes positive). From then on, we assume that the relationship φ(θ) is strictly increasing.30
Also note that for θ < θ, K(B) = K and I(B) = I, or there is no damage to the carrying capacity
due to farming until farming is viable.
We have structured the model so that agriculture is not a viable alternative initially, but that
leaves the question as to what is the initial equilibrium coalition structure for foraging. In what
follows, the specification of security costs will be important. For both foraging and agriculture, it
seems natural to assume that security costs are lower for the grand band than for bands in other
coalition structures (where there are competitors). Given this, MSfj (B) is the cost of running into
a group of competitors with lethal weapons.31
Proposition 1: For A.1, any λ, (MSfj (B)/|S
f
j |) −(MNH/|NH |) > 0 for any S
f
j 6= NH , and for
sufficiently low θ > 1/K, the unique CPE is sHN and thus the unique equilibrium band structure
in the earliest of times is the grand band of foragers B = ψ̂(sHN ) = {NH}.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
29This assumption really is one of convenience in the sense that it is not necessarily required for any of our
propositions 1 and 2 below. The proof of this is that in the example which we provide below we simply assume that
at time zero θ = 1/K(B) and φ = 0, so that both begin on the verge of viability, and then allow for θ and φ to
grow equally quickly over time (perfect technological spillovers). We then provide results for the example which are
perfectly consistent with propositions 1 and 2.
30Alternatively, we could have endogenized technological growth by assuming, for example, that mode f technology
grows faster when more individuals use it. But this would have complicated the analysis without changing the flavour
of our results. Indeed, in what follows, foraging is eventually replaced by agriculture precisely because it has become
too productive (not because agriculture has grown at a faster rate), thereby making cooperation in foraging untenable.
If our model was to account for endogenous technological growth, it would be possible to discuss the speed at which
the transition takes place, but it would not change the basic rationale underlying the transition. It should also be
noted that we do need anything specific for technological growth (e.g. constant rate of growth or discontinuities)
only that it grows over time.
31A security cost is not necessary for propositions 1 and 2 to obtain. Indeed, in a 3-player example in which
preferences are Cobb-Douglas (available upon request), the grand band of foragers may break down in the absence of
security costs. The splintering takes place because the payoff of an individual going solo comes to dominate what he
obtains within the grand band. Hence, at the critical technology level, the grand band is replaced as the equilibrium
outcome by another structure.
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We next consider the consequences of technology growth in foraging for the equilibrium coalition
structure.
Proposition 2: For any λ, N > 2, and for sufficiently high θ > 1/K, sHN is not a CPE and
thus the grand band of foragers, ψ̂(sHN ) = {NH} is not an equilibrium outcome. As technology
increases beyond a critical point there is a breakdown of cooperation due to a splintering of the
foraging band structure.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
We define θ as the critical level of technology at which the breakdown occurs. It is fully
determined in Appendix 1.
One might wonder to what extent this result is due to the equal sharing rule within bands.
Observation 4: For any λ, N > 2, and for θ >θ , there is no way to divide the resources of the
grand band of foragers to make it a CPE equilibrium band structure.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
The intuition for the splintering is strong. The conservation undertaken by the grand band
is like the provision of a public good. Now imagine a player in the grand band as technology
improves. The value of a unilateral deviation by the individual is that by breaking away, he no
longer is required to conserve — he can hunt to an individually rational level and free ride on
the conservation done by the others. The costs of deviation are that the others may not do as
much conservation, now that they compete with the deviator, and the cost of being expelled from
the band which we model as a security cost. As technology improves and labour becomes more
productive, the cost of the conservation (i.e. the loss in consumption from restricting your labour
supply) increases but the security cost remains constant. That is, at some point the value of free
riding comes to dominate even a very severe security cost and cooperation breaks down.32 To
summarize, the driving force behind the splintering is that the difference in the payoffs from a
unilateral deviation and from cooperating grows with technology. As long as this difference grows
faster than the security costs (which were assumed constant here), the splintering will take place.33
32There are alternative ways to model the cost of going it alone. One is a shunning cost, but another alternative is
a reduced potential for risk sharing. Risk sharing is discussed extensively in Johnson and Earle (1987). The foraging
economy is obviously one characterized by a great deal of risk. The grand band provided opportunities for risk sharing
which are lost in going it alone. It may be that technological growth reduces the need for risk sharing.
33If security costs are falling with technology, the splintering will obviously take place. In the case where security
costs grow with technology, the splintering will take place provided that they grow at a slower rate than the difference
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In our framework, the impact of an environmental shock, i.e. that of a change in K¯, has an
unexpected impact.
Observation 5: A society hit by a favorable (resp. adverse) environmental shock, i.e. an increase
in carrying capacity, will experience earlier (resp. later) the breakdown of cooperation due to the
splintering of the foraging band structure.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
The intuition for this result is the same as that just presented for the splintering. A favorable
environmental shock increases the cost of conservation while the security cost remains constant.
Since for any technology level, the payoff from deviating is larger, the level of technology at which
the breakdown takes place is lower. Note that this result is in sharp contrast with the orginal
environmental theories of the transition which usually argued that an exogenous and adverse envi-
ronmental shock explains the transition to agriculture.
The breakdown in cooperation can lead to unfortunate consequences.
Corollary: If the breakdown in the cooperative structure happens at a state of technology where
agriculture is not yet viable, for example, θ < θ, then one of two things happen; either there is
instability (in the sense of there being no CPE equilibrium coalition structure) or there is an equi-
librium coalition structure other than the grand band and the collapse of the grand band involves a
catastrophic (discontinuous) increase in work and decrease in the stock of animals, that is, insta-
bility and/or a potential food crisis.
To verify that there must be a discontinuous adjustment in terms of work and the animal stock
in moving away from the grand band at the critical technology, see (7).
We now turn to an illustrative example. In this example, there is a discontinuous transition
from the grand band to the singleton band structure at θ = θ . This leads to over exploitation
of the environment, a resultant drop in the foraging stock and thus a food crisis, and a drop in
leisure, in consumption, and thus in utility for each individual. Of course, the drop in utility
accompanying the breakdown of the grand band to a singleton band structure may itself trigger a
further transition, that from foraging to agriculture. This is also illustrated in our example.
in the payoffs from deviating and cooperating. Note that security costs can be interpreted as the difference in the
effectiveness of offensive and defensive weapons. The effectiveness of weapons has certainly been affected by technology
throughout history. Hirshleifer (1995, p.44–46) discusses the effectiveness of weapons. He provides historical examples
in which the effectiveness of offensive weapons relative to defensive weapons has increased, and others in which it has
decreased.
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Thus, suppose that:
• φf(li, Ei) = φl1/2i E
1/2
i ;
• m(Ei) = E2i /2 so that Li = li +E2i /2;
• N = {1, 2, 3};
• T = 24;34
• K = 10;
• γ = 1;
• M{i}f ({{i}f , {h, k}H}) = 0.225 for f = A,H and MSfj (B) = 0 otherwise;
• φ = θ − 1/K .
This last assumption implies that in the earliest of times, both technologies begin on the verge
of viability and grow one for one over time (perfect technological spillovers). This is weaker than
Assumption A.1 because both technologies are initially equally viable. Because it is weaker, we
cannot simply rely on the proofs of the above results. The results that we report below therefore
required their specific proofs. These can be consulted in an appendix available upon request.
Under the above assumptions, we can show that for any level of the externality λ ≥ 0, and
despite the viability of agriculture, the unique CPE for the lowest levels of technology (0.1 < θ < 1)
is the grand band of foragers. We can also show that for higher levels of technology (1 < θ < 2.165),
the grand band of foragers is no longer a CPE band structure and the singleton forager band
structure, B = {{1}H , {2}H , {3}H}, is a CPE band structure. Thus, at θ = 1, there is a breakdown
of cooperation due to a splintering of the foraging band structure and a transition to a new structure
where everyone is worse off. The transition involves over–hunting which leads to a food crisis. In this
example, the θ of the previous section is precisely unity which explains why the grand band breaks
down at that point. What happens at higher levels of technology (θ > 2.165) however depends on
the externality parameter λ. The equilibrium outcomes for four levels of the externality parameter
are presented in Table 1.
34The choice of T was simply to ensure Z > 0.
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Table 1: Equilibrium Outcomes
Pure Foraging, Pure Foraging, Instability, Mix of Foraging Pure Farming
Grand Band Singleton Bands No CPE and Farming
λ = 0 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
0.1 < θ < 1 1 < θ < 2.165 2.165 < θ < 2.492 2.492 < θ < 3.042 θ > 3.042
λ = 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
0.1 < θ < 1 1 < θ < 2.165 2.165 < θ < 2.399 2.399 < θ < 2.716 θ > 2.716
λ = 3.5 Yes Yes No Yes Yes
0.1 < θ < 1 1 < θ < 2.165 2.165 < θ < 2.185 θ > 2.185
λ = 5 Yes Yes No No Yes
0.1 < θ < 1 1 < θ < 2.165 θ > 2.165
For the case where there is no externality (λ = 0), further advances in knowledge (2.165 < θ <
2.492) are associated with a time of instability. At this level of knowledge, no coalition structure
satisfies the requirements of a CPE. Later, when knowledge has developed further (2.492 < θ <
3.042), we observe the start of agriculture: agriculture is adopted by two individuals while an
individual remains a forager. Note that farmers may or may not be members of the same band.
Eventually, when knowledge continues to improve (θ > 3.042), everyone has turned to agriculture.
Starting from no externality, an increase in the externality parameter λ (to λ = 1) simply
shrinks the intervals of θ for which there is instability (no CPE) and that for which there are
mixed coalition structures. For intermediate value of the externality parameter (λ = 3.5), the
mixed structures have disappeared but the Unstable – No CPE region still exists. Finally, when
the externality parameter is large enough (λ = 5), these intervals have simply disappeared and the
transition is direct from pure foraging to pure farming. This makes sense since the impact of an
increase in the externality parameter is to reduce the payoff of foraging when other individuals are
farming. An interesting and slightly different point to note is that the transition to pure farming
occurs at lower levels of technology when the externality is strong.
Thus, depending on the size of the negative externality imposed by farming on foraging, there
may or may not be instability and the co-existence of foraging and farming. We interpret this result
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as showing, realistically, that there would be no unique path from foraging to agriculture during
the Early Holocene.
8 The Tehuacan Valley in Mexico
As empirical support for our theory, we now review some of the evidence concerning the transition
from foraging to agriculture that took place in the Tehuacan Valley in Mexico between 12,000
BP and 5,400 BP. The valley lies in Southeastern Mexico in a structural trench formed by its
position between a branch of the Sierra de Oaxaca and a branch of the Sierra de Mixteca. The
mountains create a rain shadow and consequently a cloud forest at the crest of mountains and a
hot dry climate in the valley. The arid environment in the valley was ideal for preservation of the
artifacts left by the millennia of valley inhabitants who exploited the varied food resources of this
diverse environment. This valley has been extensively studied. The evidence reported here is taken
from the findings of the Tehuacan Archaeological-Botanical Project (1961–1964), led by Richard
MacNeish, which were published in The Prehistory of the Tehuacan Valley, a five volume set edited
by Douglas S. Byers and published between 1967 and 1972.35 We believe this valley provides a
suitable environment for the evaluation of the potential empirical relevance of our theory because a
well-documented archaeological record exists which begins with foraging and ends with agriculture.
It is also helpful that the valley consists of a relatively closed geography.
Our model predicts that at the lowest levels of technology, a population will form a single com-
munity of non-sedentary and cooperative (non-territorial) foragers enjoying a reasonable standard
of living. At a critical level of technology, we predict that incentives will change and result in
the cooperative structure splintering and the introduction of multiple non-cooperative bands of
foragers. So evidence for the non-cooperation present in our model would be territoriality, resource
depletion, and a lower standard of living.
The archaeological record in the Tehuacan valley has been broken into nine cultural phases
beginning with the first records of human inhabitation approximately 12,000 years ago and ending
about 500 years ago with the Spanish Conquest. The first three phases which cover over half of the
period are of direct relevance to our work. They are: the Ajuereado (12,000 BP – 9,000 BP); El
Reigo (9,000 BP – 7,000 BP); and Coxcatlan (7,000 BP – 5,400 BP). The mode of food production
35The five volumes of The Prehistory of the Tehuacan Valley are as follows. Volume 1: Environment and subsis-
tence; Volume 2: Nonceramic artifacts; Volume 3: Ceramics; Volume 4: Chronology and irrigation; and Volume 5:
Excavations and reconnaissance.
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in the former period is exclusively foraging and in the latter is a mixture of foraging and agriculture.
The partitioning into phases was on the basis of the appearance of new artifacts (e.g. tools) within
a class and whole new classes of artifacts at specified points in time.36
8.1 Ajuereado (12,000 BP – 9,000 BP)
During this period of at least three millennia, the high-end estimate for population is 50 people,
consisting of a few families (Byers, 1967-1972, Volume 5, p.361). Given the population size and
length of the period, this is a no population growth scenario. The area consists of approximately
2000 square kilometers (Byers, 1967-1972, Volume 1, p.66) and so, there was an extremely low
population density. This data strongly suggests population control. This phase coincides with late
Pleistocene and the retreat of the ice sheets giving rise to a hotter climate. There is unfortunately
no pollen record for the valley (due to a lack of preservation) which would have provided the best
evidence for the nature of environmental change. But based on changes in fauna, the speculation
on the part of researchers is that if anything, the change in environment might have been to a
hotter but moister (lusher) environment in the Tehuacan (Byers, 1967-1972, Volume 1, p.64 and
p.144).
The means of production was exclusively foraging (Byers, 1967-1972, Volume 1, Figure 186).
Hunting, particularly herd hunting, was an important source of food (Byers, 1967-1972, Volume 5,
p.362). This included now extinct horse, antelope, tortoises, and large jack rabbits (Byers, 1967-
1972, Volume 1, Figure 95) and other animals which exist today. In this period, meat is estimated
to have made up 70% of the diet, but was falling at the end of the period; Plants represented 30% of
the diet but were increasing (Byers, 1967-1972, Volume 1, p.300 and Figure 95). The manufactured
tools were all made by chipping flint. The settlement pattern of the people of the Ajuereado,37
MacNeish concludes (Byers, 1967-1972, Volume 5, pp.361–365 and p.497) that the people of the
Ajuereado Phase were nomadic based on there being no campsites with any evidence of occupation
for more than one season. And based on there being no geographical clustering of campsites, he
also concludes that they were not territorial. He concludes that ”... either several groups with no
36Also in this area in Mexico the Oaxaca Valley has been extensively studied. These studies are reported in
Flannery (1986) and Marcus and Flannery (1996) and present a considerable amount of new ideas and data to the
work on the Tehuacan. Although not the focus there is some discussion of the Tehuacan. Reynolds (1986) presents
a systems approach computational model on foraging in the Oaxaca. For central and South America more broadly
see Smith (1995).
37See the interesting map in Byers (1967-1972, Volume 5, Figure 141).
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defined territories used the whole valley in a haphazard manner or a single group roamed the whole
valley as its territory” (Byers, 1967-1972, Volume 5, p.497).
8.2 El Reigo (9,000 BP – 7,000 BP)
During this phase, the high-end estimate for population is 150 people with growth coming mainly
in the latter part of the period (Byers, 1967-1972, Volume 5, p.498). Given the size of the area,
this still represents an extremely low population density even by foraging standards. It was during
this period that there was the first evidence of the cultivation of plants with this accounting for
5% of the diet by the end of the period (Byers, 1967-1972, Volume 1, Figure 186, Figure 188, and
Table 38). Hunting was becoming less important — the horse, antelope, tortoises, and large jack
rabbits had disappeared (Byers, 1967-1972, Volume 1, Figure 95). Meat is estimated to have made
up 60% of the diet and was continuing to fall; wild plants represented 35% of the diet and were
still increasing (Byers, 1967-1972, Volume 1, Table 36 and Figure 95).
Regarding technological development between this period and the previous there was an increase
in number of types of projectile points (important for lances and dart throwers). In the former
phase, there are three point types, and in the latter, ten more types of projectile points are added
(Byers, 1967-1972, Volume 2, Figure 34). In regard to artifact types more generally, a time sequence
for 79 time sensitive artifact types has been documented (Byers, 1967-1972, Volume 2, Table 32).
In the Ajuereado 19 types exist, in the El Reigo 55 exist (36 added), and in the Coxcatlan 68 (13
added).
For our purposes, there is a telling transition in the settlement pattern between the Ajuereado
and the El Reigo.38 MacNeish concludes (Byers, 1967-1972, Volume 5, pp.366-371) that the people
of the El Reigo Phase were more settled, based on there being campsites with evidence of occu-
pation for more than one consecutive season — with relocation between sites based on exploiting
seasonal local resources — large (macro) wet season sites and smaller (micro) dry season sites.
Most importantly, based on there being a clustering of a complete set of seasonal camps with
significant geographical isolation between clusters, he concludes that the people of the valley had
become territorial.39 He concludes there is evidence “...to favour at least three or possibly four
band territories during El Reigo times” (Byers, 1967-1972, Volume 5, p.369).
38Again, see the maps in Byers (1967-1972, Volume 5, Figure 141 and Figure 144).
39He defines territoriality as the regular procurement by a group of the resources of a particular area or region.
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8.3 Coxcatlan (7,000 BP – 5400 BP)
During this phase, the high-end estimate for population is 400 people (Byers, 1967-1972, Volume
5, p.498). This phase resembled El Reigo and, in some sense, could be interpreted as the logical
conclusion of the El Reigo phase. There is evidence of more established agriculture — planting of
domesticated plants in plots or gardens.40 Cultivated plants account for 14% of the diet (Byers,
1967-1972, Volume 1, p.300), meat falls dramatically to 34% and wild plants increase to 52%.
By the end of Coxcatlan, the shares of both meat and wild plants is falling with the share of
agricultural plants increasing (Byers, 1967-1972, Volume 1, Figure 95). These trends continue
through the following six phases, but with the introduction of domesticated animals into the diet
in the next Abejas Phase. During Coxcatlan, there is evidence of less seasonal migration (Byers,
1967-1972, Volume 5, p.374) and now evidence for four or five bands with territories (Byers, 1967-
1972, Volume 5, Figure 147). MacNeish argues that the subtle differences between the El Reigo
and the Coxcatlan were caused by the settlement pattern adopted in the El Reigo (territorial and
more sedentary) and the population increase which began in the late El Reigo.
8.4 Theories of the Transition
For our purposes the important transition is from the pure foraging, nomadic, non-territorial
Ajuereado to the El Reigo with its territorial and more sedentary population exploiting some very
early agriculture. MacNeish argues it was an environmental shock during the Ajuereado which
caused the transition, not population pressure.
“Now the question arises as to whether or not these changes were due to population
pressure and settlement pattern factors. In the Ajuereado time period population does
not seem in any way to be a major force in bringing about cultural change, not only
because populations were extremely small, but also because the significant population
rise in the period of the two phases does not come until the late El Reigo times, long
after other major changes had taken place. Also macro bands and scheduled seasonal
settlement pattern occur during the El Reigo times and not before. Thus it seems
conclusive that the population and settlement pattern factors were the result, not the
40Recent research has pushed the dates for the earliest domesticates (pepo squash and bottle gourd) in the Tehuacan
back into late El Reigo phase (see Smith (1997) and (2001)). The first evidence for domesticates in Mexico as a whole
is about 10,000 BP in the Oaxaca valley.
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cause, of a shift from the Ajuereado way of life to that of the El Reigo, and the real
conditions bringing about this event were the environment changes, acting in a negative
feedback relationship with the changing use of subsistence options which had started
relatively early in the Ajuereado times.” (Byers, 1967-1972, Volume 5, p.498)
We find convincing his conclusion according to which moving to cultivation and a more sedentary
way of life caused population growth (rather than the reverse).
MacNeish suggests that the transition was caused by an environmental shock. Indeed, there
seems to be general agreement that environmental change took place in the Ajuereado, but as we
have argued earlier, there are limits to the ”environmental shock” argument as an explanation for
the transition. It must also be noted that the speculation for this valley is that the environmental
shock was a positive one to a lusher environment, not a negative one. Finally, MacNeish does
not explain how an environmental shock would have led to the territoriality element in settlement
pattern.
The introduction of territoriality and more sedentism and its potential implications for human
relationships across distinct bands seems to us to be a crucially important element of the transition.
One might argue that the shock caused agriculture and the agriculture caused territoriality. But
that seems to be inconsistent with the archaeological record. Wild foods accounted for approx-
imately 95% of the diet at the end of the El Reigo. This means that the territoriality element
of the settlement pattern came before significant agriculture, not after. It is more likely that the
partitioning of the valley into distinct band territories was a factor in the rise of agriculture. Fur-
ther, given the inherent common access nature of a foraging economy, it is clear that territoriality
would have been consistent with a breakdown of valley-wide conservation which could have had a
catastrophic impact on the stocks of their prey. This could have accounted for the extinctions. In
fact, Flannery (Byers, 1967-1972, Volume 1, p.144) argues that the speed of the extinctions of some
of the larger animals suggest over-exploitation. To summarize, the rise of foraging territoriality,
together with the possible breakdown of conservation, are important phenomena that seem to have
taken place before the transition to agriculture.
It is precisely the occurrence of those phenomena that our theoretical model of group formation
was designed to explain. By applying our model to a foraging economy, we showed that technological
growth to a critical level could cause the emergence of a non-cooperative band structure together
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with territoriality. We also showed that an environmental shock would have to be positive to
contribute to the emergence of such phenomena. Thus, we can argue that the following causal
chain is possible. After millennia of slowly improving conditions supported by population control
and improving technology, technology reaches a critical state, possibly in conjunction with an
improving environment, and this causes a splintering of the cooperative band structure and the
establishment of distinct foraging bands with territories. This in turns leads to less conservation
and over-exploitation and a resultant food crisis including extinctions. The more sedentary lifestyle
and the less productive foraging possibilities eventually make agriculture more attractive. The food
crisis would make population growth difficult particularly in the early El Reigo but eventually the
more sedentary lifestyle (less carrying of children) and the increasing importance of cultivation (with
its increased possibility of exploiting child labour) would eventually make having more children
attractive and result in population growth.
9 Conclusion
To explain the transition between important economic institutions, most economists would only be
satisfied with a model inhabited by self–interested and non–cooperative agents. At the same time,
in describing the Pleistocene, most archaeologists and anthropologists would only be satisfied with
a model incorporating the notions of cooperation and the possibility of conservation within foraging
bands. Therefore, because it allows for the non–cooperative formation of cooperative bands, our
model seems well suited to study the transition from foraging to agriculture.
While we do not claim that these did not play an important role, we intentionally avoided a
population growth or environmental shock explanation. Instead, the explanation for the transition
offered in this paper was based on technological growth and the incapacity of bands of foragers to
maintain cooperation when the productivity of foraging has reached some relatively high level. Our
story has provided an explanation for the endogenous occurrence of the transition and generated a
number of other endogenous phenomena:
• The band structure evolves in a non-trivial fashion: from large bands to smaller bands to
possibly larger bands.
• Hunting-gathering and agriculture may coexist for some time.
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• The over-exploitation of the environment that may precede the transition is not due to the
absence of an institution to prevent over-exploitation, but rather to the endogenous collapse
of such an institution (the grand band).
• According to our model, if an environmental shock is a facilitating factor in the transition, it
has to be a positive environmental shock, not an adverse shock.
• A food-crisis and extinction may precede the transition.
• During the transition, individuals may want to remain foragers, but be forced into agriculture.
They may therefore suffer a utility drop during the transition.
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11 Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1:
a) We first prove that the individual payoff in the grand band Pareto dominates the payoffs in
all other coalition structures at low levels of technology or UH∗i ({NH}) > UH∗i (B) for all B 6=
{NH} and sufficiently low θ > 1/K. For all coalition structures where all bands are of equal size
(cardinality) every individual in the coalition structure has equal utility (see (7)). But the total
utility in such a coalition structure is less than in the grand coalition by (8). Thus the equal
share of the smaller pie implies UH∗i ({NH}) > UH∗i (B) for B with all bands are of equal size. In
coalition structures with bands of unequal sizes the coalitions which are not maximal pay a security
cost MSfj (B)> 0, given this and by (7) at θ = 1/K utility in the grand band will be discretely
higher in the grand band. Therefore given the continuity of UH∗i (B) in θ and for small enough
θ > 1/K, UH∗i ({NH}) > UH∗i (B) for individuals in coalitions which are not maximal in their
coalition structure. If individuals in coalitions which are maximal in their coalition structure pay
no security costs, then for such individuals i ∈ SHj ∈ B by (7),
UH∗i ({NH})− UH∗i (B) =
2I[θK − 1]
4N [1 + |BH |]2
∣∣∣SHj
∣∣∣
[
[
1 +
∣∣BH
∣∣]2 ∣∣SHj
∣∣− 4N ]
where SHj ∈ B is a maximal coalition. Further
∣∣∣SHj
∣∣∣ > N/
∣∣BH
∣∣, therefore
[
1 +
∣∣BH
∣∣]2
∣∣∣SHj
∣∣∣ > 4N
for
∣∣BH
∣∣ ≥ 2 and θ > 1/K . So the payoff for the grand band dominates. Therefore, if those
individuals in coalitions which are maximal in their coalition structure paid per member security
costs larger than those of members of the grand band, then the grand band payoff would be even
more dominant.
b) We now prove that because UH∗i ({NH}) > UH∗i (B) for all B 6= {{NH}} for sufficiently low
θ > 1/K that the unique CPE is sHN and thus the unique equilibrium band structure in the
earliest of times is the grand band of foragers B = ψ̂(sHN ) = {NH}. The strategy profile sHN
is CPE because there are no profitable deviations. From any s 6= sHN there are profitable joint
deviations by all players with strategies SHi 6= NH and these deviations are credible because there
is no profitable deviations by any subset of initial deviators.
Proof of Proposition 2:
From (7) and the definition of the summary parameter I and with simplification the difference
∆ = UH∗i ({{N}H})− UH∗i ({{i}H , {N\i}H}) =
γ
(
θK − 1
)2 (9− 4N)
36KNθ2
+M{i}({{i}H , {N\i}H )
Thus the difference is positive at θK − 1 = 0, has a negative first derivative with respect to θ for
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θK − 1 > 0, and a negative limit as θ →∞. Therefore there is one and only one critical level of θ
for θ > 1/K denoted θ at which the difference is zero. The difference is a quadratic in θ. Denoting
M{i}({{i}H , {N\i}H}) by M,
θ =
9γK − 4γKN + 6
√(
−9MKNγ + 4MKN2γ
)
9γK2 − 4γK2N + 36MKN
for 0 < 9γK − 4γKN + 36MN
θ =
9γK − 4γKN − 6
√(
−9MKNγ + 4MKN2γ
)
9γK2 − 4γK2N + 36MKN
for 0 > 9γK − 4γKN + 36MN
When 9γK − 4γKN + 36MN > 0 it is as shown, because the other root is negative for N > 2.
When 9γK − 4γKN + 36MN < 0 it is possible that both roots are positive for N > 2 but given
the argument above only one can be such that θ > 1/K and it will necessarily be as shown — the
larger root — the other root is negative or positive but less than 1/K .
Therefore at the critical technology θ a marginal increase in θ leads to a unilateral profitable
deviation by player i from sHN to Si = {i}H which leads to ψ̂(s) = {{i}H , {N\i}H} and unilateral
deviations are always credible. Thus sHN is not CPE (it is not even a NE). Therefore the grand
band of foragers, is not an equilibrium outcome and there is a breakdown of cooperation due to
a splintering of the foraging band structure.
Proof of Observation 4:
For singleton bands a sharing rule is redundant. The total utility in the grand band of foragers
available for distribution through asymmetric sharing of work and consumption is NUH∗i ({{N}H}).
But because NUH∗i ({{i}H , {N\i}H}) > NUH∗i ({{N}H}) there is no way to divide the resources of
the grand band to make sHN immune to profitable unilateral and therefore credible deviations by
each individual and thus to make sHN a CPE.
Proof of Observation 5:
Recall that ∆(θ, K¯) is the difference in utilities (see the Proof of Proposition 2). We already know
that ∂∆/∂θ < 0. It can also be shown that for any feasible θ (i.e. θK¯ > 1 and N > 2), we have
∂∆/∂K¯ < 0.
Since θ is the solution to ∆(θ, K¯) = 0, we can apply the implicit function theorem (we have
continuity of ∆(·) in the neighbourhood of θ) to get:
∂∆
∂θ
. dθ + ∂∆
∂K¯
. dK¯ = 0 ⇐⇒ ∂θ
∂K¯
= −∂∆/∂K¯
∂∆/∂θ
< 0 
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12 Appendix 2
In section 7 of the main text, we discuss an example using the following functional forms and
parameters:
• φf(li, Ei) = φl1/2i E
1/2
i ;
• m(Ei) = E2i /2 so that Li = li +E2i /2;
• N = {1, 2, 3};
• T = 24;
• K = 10;
• γ = 1;
• M{i}f ({{i}f , {h, k}H}) = 0.225 for f = A,H and MSfj (B) = 0 otherwise;
• φ = θ − 1/K .
Then, solving the program for individual i ∈ SAj ∈ BA yields closed forms for all endogenous
variables:
lA∗i (B) = lAi =
φ4
16
for all i ∈ SAj ∈ BA (10)
EA∗i (B) = EAi =
φ2
4
for all i ∈ SAj ∈ BA
LA∗i (B) = LAi =
3φ4
32
for all i ∈ SAj ∈ BA
CA∗i (B) = CAi =
1
8
φ4 for all i ∈ SAj ∈ BA
ZA∗i (B) = T −
3
32
φ4 −
MSAj (B)∣∣∣SAj
∣∣∣
for all i ∈ SAj ∈ BA
UA∗i (B) = T +
φ4
32
−
MSAj (B)∣∣∣SAj
∣∣∣
for all i ∈ SAj ∈ BA
and then
K(B) = K¯ −
λφ2
∑
SAh ∈B
|SAh |
4
(11)
The discussion of section 7 in the main text is based on the following results.
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Result 1: For any λ and for the lowest levels of technology (0.1 < θ < 1), the unique CPE is sHN
and thus the unique band structure is the grand band of foragers B = ψ̂(sHN ) = {NH}.
Proof:
Part 1: Consider the case with λ = 0
Using (10) and the parameters in the example we derive the following tables which provide
ordinal rankings, Ri(B) for all B ∈ B and 0 < θ < 1. The indexes we use for players are h = 1, 2, 3
and i = 1, 2, 3 6= h and k 6= h and k 6= i and the highest ranking is indicated by a 1 etc..
Table A1.1: Ranking of Payoffs, λ = 0, 0.1 < θ < 0.182
Rh(B) Ri(B) Rk(B)
1) {{h}H , {i}H , {k}H} 5 5 5
2) {{h, i}H , {k}H} 6 6 8
3) {h, i, k}H 4 4 4
4) {{h}A, {i}A, {k}A} 7 7 7
5) {{h, i}A, {k}A} 7 7 7
6) {h, i, k}A 7 7 7
7) {{h}H , {i}A, {k}A} 1 7 7
8) {{h}H , {i, k}A} 1 7 7
9) {{h}H , {i}H , {k}A} 3 3 7
10) {{h, i}H , {k}A} 2 2 9
At θ ' 0.182, UHk {{h, i}H , {k}H} cuts UAi from below and thereby the rankings change. The
multiple rankings in the first two rows simply indicate that over this range of θ, these elements can
take on these rankings — first UHk {{h, i}H , {k}H} cuts UHh {{h, i}H , {k}H} from below and then
UHh {{h}H , {i}H , {k}H} from below. But the multiple rankings do not alter the proofs used below,
so we include them in one table.
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Table A1.2: Ranking of Payoffs, λ = 0, 0.182 ≤ θ < 1
Rh(B) Ri(B) Rk(B)
1) {{h}H , {i}H , {k}H} 5,6 5,6 5,6
2) {{h, i}H , {k}H} 6,7 6,7 5,6,7
3) {h, i, k}H 4 4 4
4) {{h}A, {i}A, {k}A} 8 8 8
5) {{h, i}A, {k}A} 8 8 8
6) {h, i, k}A 8 8 8
7) {{h}H , {i}A, {k}A} 1 8 8
8) {{h}H , {i, k}A} 1 8 8
9) {{h}H , {i}H , {k}A} 3 3 8
10) {{h, i}H , {k}A} 2 2 9
The problem now is to take these rankings to the coalition formation stage to determine an
equilibrium band structure.
Part 1a: For 0.1 < θ < 0.182 (Table A1.1)
From the strategy profile sHN (or B = ψ̂(sHN ) = {{1, 2, 3}H}) there are no profitable deviations
as the only Uf∗i (B) > UH∗i {{1, 2, 3}H} requires an s with at least one coalition deviating from sHN
to a strategy with A as its mode of production (rows 7–10), but this is not profitable for that
coalition. Therefore sHN is a CPE.
From any s which leads to the coalition structures in rows 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 there are always
profitable and credible deviations by the subset of players with Sfi 6= NH to SHi = NH . They are
profitable (see Table A1.1) and credibility is established by sHN being CPE. From any s which
leads to the coalition structures in rows 7 and 8, there is always a profitable and credible deviation
by i to SHi = {i}H . It is profitable for i as this deviation necessarily leads to row 9 and a unilateral
deviation is always credible. From any s which leads to the coalition structure in row 9, there is
always a profitable unilateral and therefore credible deviation by k to SHk = {k}H as this leads to
row 1. From any s which leads to the coalition structure in row 10, there is a profitable unilateral
and therefore credible deviation by k to SHk = {k}H as this leads to row 2. Therefore the unique
CPE is sHN and the unique band structure is the grand band of foragers B = ψ̂(sHN ) = {NH}.
Part 1b: For 0.182 < θ < 1 (Table A1.2)
From the strategy profile sHN (or B = ψ̂(sHN ) = {{1, 2, 3}H}) there are no profitable deviations
as the only Uf∗i (B) > UH∗i {{1, 2, 3}H} requires an s with at least one coalition deviating from sHN
to a strategy with A as its mode of production (rows 7–10), but this is not profitable for that
coalition. Therefore sHN is a CPE.
From any s which leads to the coalition structures in rows 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 there are always
profitable and credible deviations by the subset of players with Sfi 6= NH to SHi = NH . They are
profitable (see Table A1.2) and credibility is established by sHN being CPE. From any s which
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leads to coalition structures in rows 7–10 requires at least one player say k with a Sfkk and fk = A,
but then there will always be a unilateral profitable deviation to Sfkk with fk = H and unilateral
deviations are always credible. Therefore the unique CPE is sHN and the unique band structure is
the grand band of foragers B = ψ̂(sHN ) = {NH}.
Part 2: Extending to λ > 0
This extension only affects the payoffs of foragers and only in rows 7–10 where there are farmers.
In particular it lowers the foragers payoffs and more so in coalition structures with more farmers,
that is, rows 7 and 8.41 So as λ increases from 0 the payoffs in row 10 for foragers will still dominate
those in 9 but those in 10 will come to dominate 7 and 8 and eventually those in 9 will dominate
7 and 8 and then rows 7–10 will start falling in the rankings against row 3.
Part 2a: Extending to λ > 0 for 0.1 < θ < 0.182
Notice that these changes in all cases leave the proof that sHN is a CPE, as in part 1a. The
proof that any s which leads to the coalition structures in rows 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 is not CPE is also
as in part 1a.
From any swhich leads to either of the coalition structures in row 7 and 8 if UAi ({{h}H , {i}A, {k}A}) =
UAi ({{h}H , {i, k}A}) < UHi ({{h}H , {i}H , {k}A}) then exactly as with λ = 0 there is a profitable uni-
lateral and therefore credible deviation by i to SHi = {i}H . If on the other hand UAi ({{h}H , {i}A, {k}A}) =
UAi ({{h}H , {i, k}A}) ≥ UHi ({{h}H , {i}H , {k}A}) and if SHh = {h, i, k}H then there is a profitable
joint deviation by i and k to SHi = SHk = {h, i, k}H which is profitable by a farming payoff being
dominated by any foraging payoff with B = {{h, i, k}H} and is credible by sHN being a CPE.
And if SHh 6= {h, i, k}H then there is profitable joint deviation by i and k to SHi = {i}H and
SHk = {k}H which is profitable by any farmer payoff being dominated by any foraging payoff
with B = {{h}H , {i}H , {k}H} and is credible by UHi ({h}H , {i}H , {k}H ) > UHi ({h}H , {i, k}H ), and
{{h, i, k}H} not being possible with SHh 6= {h, i, k}H , and UHi ({h}H , {i}H , {k}H ) > UAi (B) and
UHk ({h}H , {i}H , {k}H ) > UAk (B) for any other B with {h}H for both i and k.
From any s that leads to the coalition structure in row 9 we must have SHh 6= SHi therefore there
is a profitable unilateral and therefore credible deviation by k to SHk = {k}H . Because it leads to
row 1 it is profitable.
From any s which leads to the coalition structure in row 10 there is a profitable unilateral and
therefore credible deviation by k to SHk = {k}H . It is profitable for k as this deviation necessarily
leads to row 2.
Part 2b: Extension to λ > 0 for 0.182 < θ < 1
Notice that in all cases the proof that sHN is a CPE is as in part 1b.. The proof that any s
which leads to the coalition structures in rows 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 is not CPE is also as in part 1b.
From any s which leads to the coalition structures in row 7 and 8 if UAi ({{h}H , {i}A, {k}A}) =
UAi ({{h}H , {i, k}A}) < UHi ({{h}H , {i}H , {k}A}) then exactly as before there is a profitable unilat-
41For foragers mixed with farmers (rows 7–10) and with λ > 0 it may even be the case that the carry capacity is
sufficiently lowered that foraging is not viable in the sense that K(B) < 1/θ for θ > 0.1. The payoff in these cases
would be T net of any security costs. Even in this case our proofs below go through.
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eral and therefore credible deviation by i to SHi = {i}H . If on the other hand UAi ({{h}H , {i}A, {k}A}) =
UAi ({{h}H , {i, k}A}) ≥ UHi ({{h}H , {i}H , {k}A}) and if SHh = {h, i, k}H then there is a profitable
joint deviation by i and k to SHi = SHk = {h, i, k}H which is profitable by any farmer payoff
being dominated any foraging payoff with B = BH and is credible by sHN being a CPE. And if
SHh 6= {h, i, k}H then there is profitable joint deviation by i and k to SHi = {i}H and SHk = {k}H
which is profitable by any farmer payoff being dominated any foraging payoff with B = BH and is
credible by UHi ({h}H , {i}H , {k}H ) > UHi ({h}H , {i, k}H ), and {{h, i, k}H} not being possible with
SHh 6= {h, i, k}H , and UHi ({h}H , {i}H , {k}H) > UAi (B) and UHk ({h}H , {i}H , {k}H ) > UAk (B) for
any other B with {h}H for both i and k.
From any s that leads to the coalition structure in row 9 we must have SHh 6= SHi therefore there
is a profitable unilateral and therefore credible deviation by k to SHk = {k}H . Because it leads to
row 1 it is profitable.
From any s which leads to the coalition structure in row 10 there is a profitable unilateral and
therefore credible deviation by k to SHk = {k}H . It is profitable for k as this deviation necessarily
leads to row 2.
Result 2a: For λ = 0 and for higher levels of technology (1 < θ < 2.165), the unique CPE band
structure is the singleton forager band structure, B = {{1}H , {2}H , {3}H}, that is, at θ = 1, there
is a breakdown of cooperation due to a splintering of the foraging band structure and a transition
to a new structure where everyone is worse off. The transition involves over–hunting which leads
to a food crisis.
Proof:
From (10) at θ > 1, UHk ({{h, i}H , {k}H}) > UHk ({{h, i, k}H}) and at θ > 2.165 some agricultural
payoffs come to dominate some payoffs in rows 1–3 (see Table A1.3).
Table A1.3: Ranking of Payoffs, λ = 0, 1 < θ < 2.165
Rh(B) Ri(B) Rk(B)
1) {{h}H , {i}H , {k}H} 6 6 6
2) {{h, i}H , {k}H} 7 7 4
3) {h, i, k}H 5 5 5
4) {{h}A, {i}A, {k}A} 8 8 8
5) {{h, i}A, {k}A} 8 8 8
6) {h, i, k}A 8 8 8
7) {{h}H , {i}A, {k}A} 1 8 8
8) {{h}H , {i, k}A} 1 8 8
9) {{h}H , {i}H , {k}A} 3 3 8
10) {{h, i}H , {k}A} 2 2 9
From the strategy profile sHN there is a profitable unilateral, and therefore credible deviation,
by k to SHk = {k}H . From any s which leads to the coalition structure in row 2 there is a profitable
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unilateral, and therefore credible, deviation by i to SHi = {i}H . Any s which leads to coalition
structures in rows 4–10 requires at least one player, say 1, with SA1 , but then there will always be
a unilateral profitable, and therefore credible deviation to SH1 = {k}H .
Therefore if there is a CPE band structure it must be the singleton foraging structure. The
profile of partnership plans s = ({1}H , {2}H , {3}H ) is immune to any deviation with fi = A as
these are not profitable. It is immune to any unilateral deviations with fi = H because it takes
a joint deviation to create a multi–player coalition. It is immune to any joint deviation by two
players to SHh = SHi (which is required to form the coalition {h, i}H ) because such a deviation is
not profitable. Finally, it is immune to a joint deviation by all players to sHN (which is required to
form the grand band of foragers) because sHN is not CPE of the subgame of all players. Therefore
the singleton coalition structure of foragers is the unique equilibrium band structure.
Result 2b: For λ ≥ 0 and for higher levels of technology (1 < θ < 2.165), the grand band of foragers
is not a CPE band structure and the singleton forager band structure, B = {{1}H , {2}H , {3}H} is
a CPE band structure. But for some λ > 0, B = {{h}H , {i}A, {k}A} or B = {{h}H , {i, k}A} may
also be CPE band structures.
Proof:
From the strategy profile sHN there is a profitable unilateral, and therefore credible deviation, by
k to SHk = {k}H . From any s which leads to the coalition structure in row 2 there is a profitable
unilateral, and therefore credible, deviation by i to SHi = {i}H .
The profile of partnership plans s = ({1}H , {2}H , {3}H ) is immune to any deviation with fi = A
as these are not profitable. It is immune to any unilateral deviations with fi = H because it takes
a joint deviation from s = ({1}H , {2}H , {3}H ) to create a multi–player coalition. It is immune to
any joint deviation by two players to SHh = SHi (which is required to form the coalition {h, i}H )
because such a deviation is not profitable. Finally, it is immune to joint deviation by all players to
sHN (which is required to form the grand band of foragers) because sHN is not CPE of the subgame
of all players. Therefore the singleton coalition structure of foragers is a CPE band structure.
From any s which leads to coalition structures in rows 4–6 there is a profitable joint devi-
ation to s = ({1}H , {2}H , {3}H ). It is profitable as it leads to row 1 and is credible because
s = ({1}H , {2}H , {3}H ) is CPE of the subgame of all players.
From any s which leads to the coalition structure in row 9 we must have SHh 6= SHi therefore
there is a profitable unilateral and therefore credible deviation by k to SHk = {k}H . Because it leads
to row 1 it is profitable.
From any s which leads to the coalition structure in row 10 there is a profitable unilateral and
therefore credible deviation by k to SHk = {k}H . It is profitable for k as this deviation necessarily
leads to row 2.
This leaves rows 7 and 8. Consider the ŝ consisting of SHh = {h, i, k}H and SAi = {i}A, and
SHk = {k}A and the following table
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Table A1.4: Possible Ranking of Payoffs, λ > 0, θ ∈]1, 2.165[
Rh(B) Ri(B) Rk(B)
1) {{h}H , {i}H , {k}H} 4 4 4
2) {{h, i}H , {k}H} 5 5 2
3) {h, i, k}H 3 3 3
4) {{h}A, {i}A, {k}A} 6 6 6
5) {{h, i}A, {k}A} 6 6 6
6) {h, i, k}A 6 6 6
7) {{h}H , {i}A, {k}A} 1 6 6
8) {{h}H , {i, k}A} 1 6 6
9) {{h}H , {i}H , {k}A} 8 8 6
10) {{h, i}H , {k}A} 7 7 9
With these payoffs ŝ is CPE. There is no deviation of any type involving h because it would not
be profitable for h. There is also no unilateral profitable deviations by either i or k because these
lead to rows 9 or 10. A joint deviation by i and k to SHi = SHk = {h, i, k}H is profitable but not
credible because there is a further profitable deviation by i to SHi = {i}H . A joint deviation by i and
k to SHi = SHk = {i, k}H is profitable but not credible because there is a further profitable deviation
by i to SHi = {i}H . A joint deviation by i and k to SHi = {i}H and SHk = {k}H is profitable but
not credible because there is a further profitable deviation by i and k to SHi = SHk = {h, i, k}H .
Result 3: At a sufficiently high state of technology, θ > 3.042, there will be a transition to a
purely agriculture structure where all individuals are farmers. For example sAN is CPE and then
B = ψ̂(sAN ) = {{1, 2, 3}A} is an equilibrium coalition structure.
Proof:
From (10) it can be verified that for θ > 3.042, λ ≥ 0, for fi = A,H and for all B ∈ B, UAi (BA) ≥
Ufii (B). That is, as technology grows payoffs for farmers in agricultural coalition structures come
to Pareto dominate all other structures (in the tables all entries in rows 4–6 are 1s). Then any
strategy profile s which leads to the coalition structures in rows 4–6 are CPE as there are no
profitable deviation.
From any s which leads to the coalition structures in rows 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, and 10 all agents with
SHi have profitable joint deviations (or unilateral deviations if there is only one such agent) to SAi .
The joint deviation is obviously profitable and is credible by all s leading to rows 4, 5, and 6 being
CPE.
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Result 4: The transition from the grand band of foragers to a purely agricultural structure can
involve unique mixed coalition structure outcomes with bands of both foragers and farmers. The
transition can also be characterized by instability where we interpret the lack of existence of a CPE
equilibrium structure as instability.
Proof:
We consider in turn the equilibrium outcomes for four values of λ (λ = 0, 1, 3.5, and 5). Table
A2.1 to A2.4 summarize the results in these cases and were used to construct Table 1 which appears
in the main text. Examples of payoff tables that were used to construct Table A2.1 to A2.4 are
available upon request.
Table A2.1: Equilibrium Outcomes, λ = 0
θ < 1 1 < θ < 2.165 2.165 < θ < 2.492 2.492 < θ < 3.042 θ > 3.042
{{h}H , {i}H , {k}H} — CPE — — —
{{h, i}H , {k}H} — — — — —
{h, i, k}H CPE — — — —
{{h}A, {i}A, {k}A} — — — — CPE
{{h, i}A, {k}A} — — — — CPE
{h, i, k}A — — — — CPE
{{h}H , {i}A, {k}A} — — — CPE —
{{h}H , {i, k}A} — — — CPE —
{{h}H , {i}H , {k}A} — — — — —
{{h, i}H , {k}A} — — — — —
Table A2.2: Equilibrium Outcomes, λ = 1
θ < 1 1 < θ < 2.165 2.165 < θ < 2.399 2.399 < θ < 2.716 θ > 2.716
{{h}H , {i}H , {k}H} — CPE — — —
{{h, i}H , {k}H} — — — — —
{h, i, k}H CPE — — — —
{{h}A, {i}A, {k}A} — — — — CPE
{{h, i}A, {k}A} — — — — CPE
{h, i, k}A — — — — CPE
{{h}H , {i}A, {k}A} — — — CPE —
{{h}H , {i, k}A} — — — CPE —
{{h}H , {i}H , {k}A} — — — — —
{{h, i}H , {k}A} — — — — —
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Table A2.3: Equilibrium Outcomes, λ = 3.5
θ < 1 1 < θ < 2.165 2.165 < θ < 2.185 θ > 2.2.185
{{h}H , {i}H , {k}H} — CPE — —
{{h, i}H , {k}H} — — — —
{h, i, k}H CPE — — —
{{h}A, {i}A, {k}A} — — — CPE
{{h, i}A, {k}A} — — — CPE
{h, i, k}A — — — CPE
{{h}H , {i}A, {k}A} — — CPE —
{{h}H , {i, k}A} — — CPE —
{{h}H , {i}H , {k}A} — — — —
{{h, i}H , {k}A} — — — —
Table A2.4: Equilibrium Outcomes, λ = 5
θ < 1 1 < θ < 2.165 θ > 2.165
{{h}H , {i}H , {k}H} — CPE —
{{h, i}H , {k}H} — — —
{h, i, k}H CPE — —
{{h}A, {i}A, {k}A} — — CPE
{{h, i}A, {k}A} — — CPE
{h, i, k}A — — CPE
{{h}H , {i}A, {k}A} — — —
{{h}H , {i, k}A} — — —
{{h}H , {i}H , {k}A} — — —
{{h, i}H , {k}A} — — —
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